G'day,
The ATSB preliminary report into the Richmond buffer snot incident has been released.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...r/ro-2018-004/
While specific details retrieved from the train event recorders plus video recorders have not been included, the general incident is explained.
Train speed prior to impact being a guestimated average of 35 kph along the platform.
HMMM.
We will need to await the final report to discover just what position the brake valve was in.
Plus, whether the train crew were due to be relieved upon arrival, or work the return service back east to the city.
Since the Waterfall prang in january 2003, all emu and dmu trains operating within NSW have been fitted with a vigilance system.
This being in addition to the dead-man throttle control.
The driver of the Waterfall incident having suffered a heart attack and collapsing over the control stand.
When utilizing the T-bar throttle dead-man feature found on Tangarbage sets, it must be twisted from 135 degrees and held in the 180 degs position.
The throttle being moved towards the body to increase notch and power.
Hence when the driver collapsed onto the control stand, his body held the t-bar dead-man horizontally negating an emergency brake application.
The train continuing down hill in full power until going bush.
T sets also possess a dead-man foot pedal which can be utilized in lieu of the t-bar throttle handle.
However, many drivers found the foot pedal awkward to manipulate, especially when traversing rough track.
So, to prevent future incidents, a vigilance system was implemented in addition to the dead-man.
The vigilance system being that which was implemented subsequent to the Beresfield coal train collision in 1997.
Prior vigilance systems found on NSW locomotives were of the 90 second frequency being able to reset at any time within the 90 seconds.
Either the driver or fireman could reset the vigo by depressing the buttons provided.
It was deemed at the Beresfield investigation, that train crew could become automated in current vigo system response.
Performing this even if semi-asleep.
I was involved with the testing and implementation of the randomly timed from 25 to 45 second vigo system being mandated.
Only the driver was to be provided with a response button in the loco cab.
And, response could only be effected once the warning light had illuminated.
If the button was then not depressed after a short period an alarm would sound, thence the emergency brake application would occur.
Consequently, task linking was to be incorporated.
I had discovered that when shunting, the newbie system was not manageable.
With the head out the side window watching for hand signals, it was not possible to observe the warning light.
The very brief period subsequent from the alarm to emergency penalty not providing sufficient time to reach the button.
So, I demanded that a second button be installed at the drivers side window to permit quicker response.
A vigo foot pedal for response was awkward for positioning due to the existing sand pedal.
And would the driver find the correct foot pedal with his head out the window.
Task linking provided being movement of the throttle, dynamic brake handle, full application of the engine brakes, plus suppression position of the automatic train brake valve.
Three classes of diesel motive power not possessing dynamic brake, were thereby limited in task linking function.
I had requested that train whistle operation also be task linked, but such was deemed too expensive to incorporate.
Those three classes of motive power, and indeed others, possessing the old timer dangling cord for whistle operation.
And FORGET about task linking the drivers seat for movement, management just smirked when I blandly suggested that.
Any task linked function occurring within the random time period cycle automatically resetting the vigo.
Otherwise, response could only occur once the warning light illuminated at the termination of the random time period.
I was concerned that drivers when shunting would resort to manipulating the throttle in repetition to negate the vigo.
That potentially creating a dangerous situation if powering at the wrong time.
I have not squizzed the controls of an A set (Waratah), but presume that such would be similar to a T set.
I am assuming that task linking on emu and dmu sets would be similar to that found on locomotives.
Manipulation of the brake valve negating the vigo via task linking during stopping at a station.
A sets being provided with regenerative blended EP on motor cars.
Regenerative brake system returning to the overhead the traction motor current created during braking.
Dynamic brake system dispensing the current created in resistance grids on the roof.
Otherwise driver distraction would occur if required to respond to the vigo while in the process of stopping.
The right hand on the T-bar dead-man throttle in idle position, the left hand working the brake valve.
Remove the right hand to respond to the vigo and the dead-man penalty emergency brake application would occur.
Remove the left hand from the brake valve to respond and you could stop short or overshoot.
OK, the driver could be utilizing the dead-man foot pedal, permitting the right hand to be liberated from the throttle.
But, I wonder if the A sets have a similar awkward dead-man foot pedal as do T sets.
There may indeed be a vigo foot pedal with which to respond as well as the button.
I will need to ask questions of me ETR buddy.
I certainly would want a foot pedal in companion with the button, had I been involved with the emu and dmu adaptation.
Steve.