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Autonomous trains
Autonomous trains, is that the future for rail safety ?
With computer geeks aspiring for driverless transport, what of the future for blue collar workers.
Rio Tinto Australia have successfully operated the first driverless iron ore train.
Driverless ore dumper trucks have been rattling around mines for a while now.
Yes, Bart in the USA, and some French commuter trains are driverless.
Many airports now have driverless rubber tire trains.
The Sydney monorail was driverless.
But, these operate on closed infrastructure with no interaction from other types of trains.
Amusingly, after the first failure of the smog hollow monorail, an attendant was installed to calm the cattle.
The Bart conductor working the doors etc and monitoring progress.
Ok, the Rio Tinto ore train is not likely to encounter any other type of train either.
The newbie private commuter rail system in Sydney will be driverless.
It will spend half the journey elevated in the atmosphere, and the remainder buried in darkness.
Yes, a closed network that will not interact with the existing rail network.
During an incident, radio transmissions will direct cattle how to smash windows and install the steps to escape.
HMMM, I wonder.
Human Error is probably the major stumbling point for crewed transport.
Distraction, fatigue, and in some cases medical situations.
BUT, human error can also affect computer software.
The Mount Erebus Antarctica aeronautical accident when incorrect data was input on the flight computer comes to mind.
And, what about hacking.
If hackers can gain entry into secure Government installations, then why not transport systems.
My only exposure to ATC was the Erickson equipment being tested on SRA locomotive 8650.
The tests conducted on a short section of the Illawarra line in Sydney many years ago.
I was not involved with any testing.
But, some time later, I worked a train with 8650.
We were signed on duty engine prepared, and whistled out of Delec to run LE to collect our train at Chullora.
8650 trailed running Light Engine, but became lead when working the train home to Lithgow.
Blasting off, we had to navigate Chullora Junction running at slow speed.
However, once clear of the Junction, train speed was increased.
The minute that we reached 25 kph, the air went bringing us to a hasty halt.
My driver complaining that he could not reset the vigilance yelled for me to go back and investigate.
Oddly, the air was not escaping from the air rack, but instead from a weird box at the opposite end.
Before I could attempt to investigate the air stopped dumping, so I returned to the cab.
Away we went after the brakes pumped up.
But, again, the air dumped when reaching 25 kph.
This time, my driver complaining about the BOX on the dash blinking at him.
AH!.
The Erickson thing was alive.
No OFF switch could be found, so I again went into the engine room to investigate.
But, checking out the weird box inside making all the air noise, no switch was obvious either.
Checking out the mini-circuit breaker panel, I found a pair with texta scrawl above stating DO NOT SWITCH ON.
Flicking those off killed the Erickson thing.
We journeyed home without further incident.
At home, I went into the chargemans office to make enquiries.
Obviously, 25 kph was the default speed for the system when no track transponders could be detected.
The electrical mob said that they would install seals on those two switches to prevent further problems.
The results of those ATC tests were shelved due to the extreme cost of the system.
However, ATC is again on the agenda for the Sydney Metrop.
The Sydney Light Rail utilizes ATC.
But, I doubt that such prevents collisions with pedestrians or motorists who accidentally get in the way of a tram.
The Train Stop apparatus employed in the Sydney Metrop has worked very well for many years.
OK, it only stops the train after it has passed a Stop signal.
But, with the double overlap normally employed in the Metrop, only a slow speed collision is possible.
However, no freight locomotives are fitted with the train stop apparatus.
All suburban and interurban trains have Dead Man control.
This was found wanting in the Waterfall incident.
The driver collapsing over the T-bar throttle in full notch negated the deadman control.
Either twist the T-bar throttle to negate the deadman, or plant yer feet on the foot pedal to let go of the throttle.
Yes, the Guard could have pulled the tail to halt the train.
But, I doubt that he realized in time before the train hit the 55 kph curve and went bush.
Subsequently, all emu and dmu trains now have a vigilance system as well as the dead man control.
With all the doo-dads in the cab to monitor, will the driver ever glance out the windscreen again ?
Only time will tell if driverless trains will solve the human error dilemma.
Steve.
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