Amtrak woes continue
 

On sunday, in South Carolina, Amtrak has sadly suffered a third fatal rail accident. The Amtrak Engineer and Conductor being killed in the collision, with many injured passengers. From preliminary reports, it appears that a CSX freight train was put away into a siding, and for some inexplicable reason the switch (points) were left lined to that siding. Running without signals for the region, thereby under paperwork, the Amtrak train came around the curve and entered the siding colliding with the unmanned CSX freight train. No doubt that this latest incident will add further impetus for the complete installation of Positive Train Control.
Steve.

Wow, that's terrible.
I suppose the question going through my head is..were they manual points or remotely operated?

Positive Train Control can't come soon enough. But the USA is a very big place and it takes time and a shed-load of money to do. But no one could argue that it isn't necessary.

BW

This type of accident was stopped in the U.K. over 100 years ago. I realise that the vast distances in the U.S.A. make things more difficult but to have facing points on a main line without signal cover in this day and age is criminal. With the cost of electronics dropping all the time, why can a remote installation for facing points not be arranged ?

G'day Tony and BW,
I have been attempting to find the relevant CSX track chart for the region.
But so far have not managed to google it.
The territory is apparently operated under DTC, which is utilized in numerous US regions.
Yes, the switch was manual.
Direct Train Control is utilized here in Australia, on sections where rail traffic is not frequent.
Train Control authorizing a train to proceed from A to B occupying certain block sections.
Points are usually manual within such regions.
From the aerial photograph displaying the Amtrak train 91 prang, it appears that the main line actually diverges to proceed past the designated siding.
The NTSB accident report will make for interesting reading.
Without track circuiting existing at the switch, the alignment may not be detectable with PTC.
Steve.

I guess the old cost/benefit ratio applies here. And the old chestnut...what price a life ?

There are probably thousands of sidings with manual switches for sidings in the US.

Yes, absolutely. A warning signal located at service braking distance (2k in the UK) from the sidings They could possibly save themselves cabling costs and use a radio link. Lineside solar panels make this plausible.

Otherwise, tie in the switch detection to PTC. Once again it could be done by radio link or internet. Obviously if the link drops, the train has to go at caution and examine the position of the switch. Time consuming and a PITA, but better than a train wreck.

BW

G'day BW,
More info is coming to light about this tragic incident.
The CSX Columbia Subdivision does indeed possess ABS signal system.
The switch in question has an electric release.
However, at the time of this incident, the signalling system was suspended for trackwork.
This reverted the switch to manual operation with no remote detection.
The Amtrak train was proceeding under DTC authorized be CSX Train Control.
So, I guess that it all comes down to just what transpired at the location.
And, whether CSX TC was aware of what had transpired.
The CSX freight train being reversed into the siding and then stabled.
Here in NSW back in 2009 we had a sorta similar potential drama.
Train control got it wrong when issuing the two Special Proceed Authorities.
The UP Main line between Tarana and Kelso (Bathurst) had been closed for trackwork.
Consequently the signals were inoperative at Tarana.
Single line from Wallerawang to Tarana thence double line to Kelso.
Two passenger trains sat at Tarana facing each other, the UP XPT and the Down Indian Pacific.
Fortunately, the collision was averted by quick thinking on behalf of the train crews.
Steve.

Thanks for that AS, it makes sense.

That's the danger of degraded working. I'll bet some poor souls are having trouble sleeping right now.

BW

G'day BW,
I have scrounged the 2008 CSX Time Table for the Florence Division, which includes the Columbia Subdivision.
I have also scrounged a satellite image map covering the location of the incident, naturally shot well before the collision.
I now know the exact location of the incident, The Silica siding and Auto (cars) ramp sidings at Dixiana.
Passenger train track speed being 60 MPH through this section (according to the 2008 TT).
Reducing to 45 MPH just south of the sidings, I presume for a curve.
The Silica siding, on which the empty Auto rack freighter was stabled diverges to the west side of the single Main Line.
The Auto ramp sidings diverging to the east side of the single track Main Line.
Due to the ABS signal system being suspended for trackwork, Amtrak 91 would have held numerous DTC Block authorities.
Including DTC Block Gaston in which this siding exists.
The train Conductor being in the loco cab to scribble down the various DTC block authorities en route.
Had only the Engineer been up front, the train would need to stop each time that a newbie authority was required.
If the CSX freighter was northbound, as indicated by the location of the locomotives, I wonder why it reversed into the siding.
A south end switch also granting access to the Silica siding.
Possibly other rolling stock may have occupied the southern end of the Silica siding.
Incident photos scrounged on the www don't display the south end of the siding.
Possibly the freighter was southbound, and the locomotives were run-around the train prior to stabling after entering the siding.
Shunting into the Auto ramp sidings is only possible from the north end.
Southbound Amtrak 91 encountered the switch lined into the Silica siding.
It travelled for approximately 6 car lengths, a guestimate of 500 feet and collided with the locomotives of the freighter.
Vision of the freighter may have been partially occluded by the overpass bridge of highway 321.
The CSX locomotives parked just south of this bridge, stabled thereby a blackout classification lights wise.
And travelling probably at the permitted sectional speed of 60 MPH, would not have stopped in time to avoid the collision.
Hitting the switch at high speed would have unsettled and confused the head-end crew.
And, if I am reading the 2013 Amtrak schedule correctly, train 91 would have been traversing this area at around 2 AM.
OK, some facets of this may have altered since the 2008 TT and 2013 Amtrak schedule.
A press announcement yesterday has potential serious ramifications for the Du Pont Amtrak 501 derailment in december.
Plus, could also impact on this Amtrak 91 collision.
Originally, the Amtrak Engineer involved in the 2015 Philadelphia high speed derailment was cleared of criminal charges.
The incident determined as an accident.
However, another court has again indicted the Engineer filing for criminal charges.
The Amtrak Northeast Regional hitting a 50 MPH curve at 106 MPH naturally went bush.
A knee-jerk reaction to this 2015 prang was the demand for seatbelts to be installed in all long haul passenger trains.
E GADs, what an infrastructural nightmare would be imposed by having seatbelts in trains.
Yes, I know that here in NSW, long haul omnibusses possess seatbelts.
The "Coach captain" only being able to observe via his inside rearvision mirror if cattle have not click-clacked.
So, the go is to perch in a seat behind a large framed person to occlude the coach captains' view.
Conductor to the passenger sitting in seat 35 car B, my annunciator panel indicates that you have not click-clacked.
This train does not depart until you have click-clacked.
YEH RIGHT.
Hopefully, this latest criminal indictment will go the way of the previous indictment, plus seatbelts demand.
Yes, people were killed and many injured.
But, the Engineer didn't hurl his train around a curve at double the speed on purpose.
He simply forgot where he was, being distracted when passing another train having reported an emergency situation.
Steve.